Page 80 - Unit 731 Testimony

The Soviets were interested in Ishii and his organization for three
important reasons. One was the proximity of the unit's operations to Soviet
territory. Next, of course, was the desire for revenge for Japan's use of

biological warfare against Soviet soldiers. The third motivation was the
prospect of obtaining grist for the propaganda mill. Whereas America
wanted to forego trying some highly-educated medical researchers as war
criminals as part of a quiet quid pro quo, the Soviets wanted to make noise.
The request went to MacArthur's headquarters. On February 7, 1947,

MacArthur sent a dispatch to Washington: "Prosecutor for USSR at IMTFE
(International Military Tribunal Far East) requests permission to interrogate
former Japanese General Ishii, Colonel Kikuchi, and Colonel Ota, all
formerly connected with Bacteriological Warfare research . . . Request
based on information . . . that experiments authorized and conducted by
above . . . resulted in deaths of 2000 Chinese and Manchurians."

"Opinion here," MacArthur continued, "that Russians not likely to
obtain information from Japanese not already known to United States and
that United States might get some additional information from Russian line
of questioning in monitored interrogations." The contest of wits and

information-maneuvering between America and Russia was on. Should the
U.S., MacArthur asked the War Department, acquiesce to the Russian
request?
About six weeks later, toward the end of March 1947, permission came

from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington for a "SCAP-controlled Soviet
interrogation" of Ishii, Kikuchi, and Ota. Before the U.S. let the Soviets get
to them, however, Kikuchi and Ota were to be interviewed by competent
American personnel. The War Department expressed its readiness to
dispatch such personnel to Tokyo for a preliminary interrogation secret
from the Soviets, then for monitoring the subsequent Soviet interrogation. If
the preliminary interrogations brought out any important facts, the Japanese

ex-officers were to be instructed not to reveal them to the Soviets, and also
not to tell the Soviets that the preliminary interrogations had taken place.
The Americans' line of reasoning in denying the Soviets unfettered access
to the prisoners was that war crimes allegedly committed against Chinese
did not represent a legitimate war crime interest for the Soviets, and that

U.S. permission for the Soviets to conduct investigations should be
considered to have been granted purely as a friendly gesture.