Page 21 - Unit 731

bacteriological research. Kitano, by contrast, was more cooperative in response to Thompson’s investigation.
The following is the record of Ishii’s questioning by Thompson:

Q: Who first authorised the beginning of BW research in Japan?
A: There were no orders giving consent to research in BW. If there were, we would have received all the money, personnel, and materials we wanted to carry on this research. Since there were no
orders, we only conducted the BW research on a very small scale (1 to 2 per cent) in the Water Purification Bureau.
Q: Who in the War Ministry gave official approval to permit the work to be carried on?
A: The members of the War Ministry did not seem to have any scientific bent. Most of them were of the old school which depended upon the spirit of the Japanese people and not scientific methods
to win the war. They did not listen to any of my requests. I did not ask for help directly from the War Ministry. I had to go through channels which meant through the Kwangtung Army.
Q: Did the Kwangtung Army get money from the War Ministry for BW research?
A: I would hand in my requisition for funds. There was no appropriation titled, ‘BW’. It all came under Preventive Medicine and Water Purification.
Q: When was the official approval first given to start work on BW and by whom?
A: There was no official sanctioning.
Q: That is hard to believe.
A: If I had labelled my request ‘BW’ it would have been cut off by the higher-ups. It was all under Preventive Medicine and Water Purification. When I received the money, I used it at my own
discretion.
…
Q: Was the commander of the Kwangtung Army in favour of BW research?
A: I never met that man and I do not know what his opinion was.
Q: I cannot see how this work could be done without anybody’s approval.
A: I could not achieve what I had planned due to the fact that I did not receive approval.
Q: I am led to understand that you start this work under your own initiative and carried it out on your own responsibility.
A: Yes.
Q: Was the Emperor informed of BW research?
A: Not at all. The Emperor is a lover of humanity and never would have consented to such a thing. 4
Shirō Ishii concealed many facts from Lt-Col. Thompson; for example, he said he had never met the commander of the Kwantung Army, his direct
supervisor, and that ‘the Emperor [knew] nothing about the study of bacteriological warfare’. He also stated that ‘the Emperor advocates humanism, and he
would not agree to such study’. Ishii fully understood that Unit 731 had committed inhumane acts, but he did not halt the study or use of bacteriological
weapons, through which he was promoted to higher rank. During his tenure in Unit 731, Ishii was promoted from junior officer to lieutenant-general as an
army surgeon. He also ambitiously said: ‘Why could not an army surgeon be a captain general? It is unfair!’
Interrogation of Masaji Kitano
Masaji Kitano, the second commander of Unit 731, was interrogated by Lt-Col. Thompson on 5 February 1946. The following is the record of Kitano’s
questioning by Thompson:
Q: What BW work was conducted at institutions other than at Heibo?
A: Because of the secret nature of BW, no work was done at other institutions.
Q: It is inconceivable that BW research was limited to a single institution, Heibo when other research in Japan, equally as classified, was conducted at many institutions.
A: BW is a restricted subject, prohibited by the Geneva Convention, and thus was not an authorised activity.
Q: Who authorised initiation of BW research?
A: Ishii. 5
Under interrogation by Thompson, Kitano stated the Unit had done bacteriological warfare research, which violated international treaties and was limited
and clearly prohibited by the Geneva Protocol. Kitano made similar statements in his written material submitted to the American military as followed.

I believed that we should have abandoned the research on bacteriological weapons and made efforts to advance the prevention and treatment of communicable diseases. A bacteriological weapon is a
misuse of medical science and it was taken up at the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations as a social problem of international significance. Based upon my own medical knowledge, I
think the application of bacteriological weapons for military purposes requires a good deal of work with little to be gained. In fact, we should have no occasion to use it even if we were to complete the
study of it, because, for those who are winning a war, it is not necessary to resort to it and thus risk causing an international problem. If those who are losing a war resort to it, the result can only be
disgrace. At the beginning of a war when there is no way of telling which side is winning or losing, I firmly believe that the bacteriological weapon is not a decisive weapon. 6
As commander, Kitano knew that the use of bacteriological weapons was ‘inhumane and violation of the international principle’ for which he could gain
‘notoriety’.
Unit 731 extensively used prisoners of war and civilians as experiment subjects during Kitano’s tenure as commander from August 1942 to March
1945, the crucial stage of large-scale production and development of bacteriological weapons. The statements by Shirō Ishii and Masaji Kitano completely
contradict their actions. It is obvious that they intended to conceal bacteriological warfare and human experiments, to shirk war crime responsibility, and to
evade trial by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

The Establishment of Unit 731
To most people in Harbin, China, 5 February 1932 is an unforgettable date: the beginning of humiliation and sorrow. From that day onward, Harbin, a
transportation hub of north-east Asia with a population of more than a million, was occupied by Japan as a colony until the surrender of Japan in 1945.
That same year, following his own observation of warfare in Europe, Shirō Ishii urged the use of bacteriological warfare in Japan. After high-ranking
soldiers actively persuaded them, many officers of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff Office and the Army Ministry supported Ishii’s suggestion.

Departure from Tokyo: The Beginning of Bacteriological Warfare Research
On 5 July 1932, the Army Ministry approved the establishment of the Bacteriological Research Institute in the School of Army Surgeons, which was later
changed to the Research Institute of Epidemic Prevention, of which Shirō Ishii, Ryūji Kajitsuka, Nishimura Eiji, Masataka Kitagawa, Ren Watanabe,
Enryō Hōjō, and Hatsutarō Shirakawa were major members. These seven were active members before the foundation of Unit 731 and later became
supporters, promoters, and administrators of bacteriological warfare.
Ryūji Kajitsuka later held the office of Secretary of Surgeons of the Kwantung Army; Nishimura Eiji as Head of Unit 1855 in Beijing; Kitagawa as
Secretary of the Bacteriological Research, Unit 731; Watanabe as Secretary of 12th Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department; Enryō Hōjō
(assistant to Shirō Ishii) had worked in the Medical Bureau of the Army Ministry; and Hatsutarō Shirakawa had been the Secretary of 29th Epidemic
Prevention and Water Purification in Battlefields.
The aim of the foundation of the Research Institute of Epidemic Prevention is recorded in 50 Years of History of the School of Army Surgeons:

The Research Institute of Epidemic Prevention as the research institution related to military operations and epidemic prevention in our nation, has recently been founded in the School of Army